Institutional investors' effects on Stock Price Synchronicities: Evidence of Shanghai Stock Exchange by Liu, Zhouqi
1 
 
  
 
 
Master program in Finance 
 
 
 
 
Institutional investors’ effects on Stock 
Price Synchronicities:  
------Evidence of Shanghai Stock Exchange 
 
 
Zhouqi Liu 
gfn14zli@student.lu.se 
 
 
 
 
NEKN02  
Master thesis (15 credits ECTS) 
June 2015  
Supervisor: Karl Larsson, Rikard Green 
Examiner: 
  
 2 
 
Statement of co-authorship 
The partially part of CH1.introduction, CH2.theory and background, CH3.Hypothese 
development and CH4.Methodology are worked out together with Zerui, Wang.  
 
  
 3 
 
Abstract 
The tendency of stock prices always attracts investors’ attention, which is related to 
their earnings. So it is increasingly concerned that what information will affect the 
stock markets and how the stock market reacts to investors’ investment strategy. So 
this paper investigates the phenomenon of stock price synchronicity in Shanghai 
Stock Exchange, and what reflects stock price synchronicity in terms of firm-specific 
information and institutional investors’ characteristics. We use the proxy of stock 
price synchronicity: R-square statistic is decreasing within the time period, as which 
reflects the maturity procedure of the China’s equity market. Based on stock market 
information and institutional specific information from 2007 to 2012, we find a 
significantly negative relation between stock price synchronicity and institutional 
investors’ shareholdings, and domestic institutional investors have larger effects than 
foreign institutional investors because of the easy access to firm-specific information. 
Moreover, the inner associated relation between firm-specific information and 
institutional investors’ characteristics is explored.  
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Abbreviations 
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1. Introduction 
Synchronicity means coincidence during time, a factor which is independent of space 
and time (Jung, C. G., 1985). That means two or more events are unrelated but moves 
at the same step. The phenomenon that individual firm’s stock price is moving with 
the market index is called stock price synchronicity. For example, while the market 
index of one equity market goes up, individual firm’s stock price is going up as well. 
According to the study stock price synchronicity, investors get this information of the 
markets and make investment strategies afterwards. Stock price synchronicity can be 
used in practice, since it has been proved by Morck (2000). 
Base on Morck’s (2000) theory, stock price synchronicity is a phenomenon that 
individual firms’ stock prices are going up and down with the market. The higher the 
stock price synchronicity, the higher is probability that the particular stock price trend 
can be explained by the market. In his paper, stock price synchronicity is related to 
macro market condition, such as GDP, and micro effects as firm’s structural 
information. The latter researches identify and prove Morck’s theory, but most of 
researchers concentrated on analyzing developed markets in US and Europe, only a 
few were working on emerging markets like China.  
Concerning Yin (2010), stock price synchronicity is connected to institutional 
investors’ characteristics. The shareholding ratio of the institutional investors, the 
number of institutions, and trading amount are well analyzed. As Warner (1993) state, 
the specific exposure information of the firms is also key factors in affecting stock 
price synchronicity. With regard to these researches, the main purpose of this paper is 
to find the relationship between stock price synchronicity of Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and institutional investors’ properties. Firm-specific information is 
employed as control variables.  
Thereby, three research questions are coming up: 
1) Is Chinese stock price synchronicity increasing or decreasing?  
2) Is firm-level information important in affecting the stock price synchronicity?  
3) Which kind of institutional investors’ characteristics is playing an important role 
in the stock price synchronicity? 
By analyzing stock price synchronicity, all participants in this market are getting 
benefits. For individual investors, they can choose investment strategy by considering 
the different levels of stock price synchronicity of the firms; For institutional investors, 
other institutions’ investment strategy and firm-specific information exposure are the 
things they caring about. For firms, the reaction of investors is valuable for them to 
plan for future development.  
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The panel data analysis is used in this paper twice. Firstly, the panel regression of the 
proxy of stock price synchronicity is calculated. The database in SSE consists of 905 
firms since 2007 to 2012, and it is daily data of individual firms and the market. 
Secondly, the explained variable is stock price synchronicity and the independent 
variables are institutional investors and firm-specific information. This panel 
regression consists of 48 firms in cross-sectional dimension and 24 quarters in period 
dimension. 
There are certain limitations in our research. I might get opposite results against our 
theoretical sources. According to Morck (2000), the synchronicity will decrease if the 
GDP of the country increases. The result of this paper might increase in stock price 
synchronicity in some years. Moreover, almost all researches are written before 2007, 
but the time period I are going to analyze is after the subprime crisis. The choice of 
variables will also affect our empirical results, the chosen of a few firm-specific 
information leads to the bias between our result and the practical condition. 
This dissertation is organized as follows: Section 2 states the summary and review of 
theories and background; Section 3 demonstrates hypotheses development based on 
these; Section 4 presents the research methods, including the data, the measurements 
of synchronicities and empirical model under this research; Section 5 provides the 
data collected, the empirical results and analysis and robustness checks. Section 6 
presents our conclusion. 
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2. Theory and background 
2.1. China’s Stock market 
The economic growth rate in China the recent three decades has been dramatic. The 
average annual growth rate is around 10% from 1978 to 2012. China’s GDP reached 
￥51.9 trillion in 20121. Thus, China has become the world’s third largest economy. 
The economic scale and the equity market are inter-correlated. After drawing attention 
to magnificent economic growth, Chinese equity market is beginning to be paid more 
and more concerns, and plenty of companies formed as professional investors and 
begin to invest in China’s two stock exchanges. With fast economic growth, thereby 
came the foundation of two main stock exchanges in China’s mainland: SSE and 
SZSE. The SSE established in Nov, 26
th
, 1990, and it is governed by CSRC. After 
more than 20 year’s development, SSE has become the most important stock 
exchange in China considering the listed companies, the listed shares and the total 
market value. Till the end of 2012, there were 954 listed companies, 998 listed stocks. 
The total market value of stocks reached 15.9 trillion yuan (The unit of RMB), and 
the float market capitalization was 13.4 trillion yuan. Numbers of national economic 
pillar enterprises, key enterprises, basic industries and high-tech companies are listed. 
They help to raise funds for development of the China’s economy.2 The Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange (SZSE), which is also governed by CSRC, established in 1990. SZSE 
uses a multi-tier capital market system. By the end of 2012, the SZSE had 1,411 listed 
companies, with 484 in Main Board, 646 on the SME and 281 on the ChiNext. The 
total capitalization was about 6.7 trillion yuan. 
A shares and B shares are traded in both SSE and SZSE. A-shares are called as 
RMD-denominated Ordinary Shares, which is valued and traded in RMD. A-shares 
can only be traded by domestic investors and selected foreign institutional investors, 
which can also be called as QFIIs. Oppositely, B-shares are defined as domestically 
listed foreign investment shares, and another name of B-shares is RMB special shares, 
B shares are valued in RMB but traded in USD. Before 2001, B-shares can only be 
traded by foreign traders, since 2001, domestic investors can also trade with B shares. 
In this paper,I am going to analyze the different effects of foreign and domestic 
institutional investors on A-shares. 
2.2. Stock price synchronicity 
2.2.1. Definition of stock price synchronicity 
Synchronicity is a meaningful coincidence in time, a factor which is independent of 
                                                             
1 Source: http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/ 
2 Source: http://english.sse.com.cn/ & http://www.szse.cn/main/en/ 
 11 
 
space and time (Jung, C. G., 1985). That means two or more events are unrelated but 
move at the same step. In Roll’s research (1988), he recommended that stock price 
synchronicity measures the extent to which stock prices in one markets move together 
and depends on the relative amounts of firm-level and market-level information 
capitalized into stock prices. 
As for the academic definition of stock price synchronicity by Roll (1988) and Morck 
(2000), the following equation is the very first version of stock price synchronicity: 
𝑓𝑡 =
𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝑛𝑡
𝑢𝑝
, 𝑛𝑡
𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛]
𝑛𝑡
𝑢𝑝
+ 𝑛𝑡
𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛  
where 𝑛𝑡
𝑢𝑝
 is the days of single stocks that raised in the past period t, 𝑛𝑡
𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 is the 
days of that stocks that dropped in the past period t. ft means the max proportion of 
stock price that either goes up or down. The number lies between 0.5 and 1. If one 
market’s ft is reaching up to 1, its market is mostly synchronous, and vice versa. 
As I have mentioned before, this measurement is intuitive but not related to 
contemporary business model, so Morck came up another measurement index: R
2
. 
This measurement index comes from CAPM, which is most widely used business 
model in analyzing companies’ return considering market’s return. And his empirical 
model is basically formed as: 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 
where, for firm 𝑖 and day 𝑡, 𝑅𝑚 is the A-share market return calculated by the 
A-share market index, 𝑅𝑒𝑡 is the individual stock daily return and 𝜀 represents the 
random errors. This A-share market return is from the official daily announcement. 
The equation above let us effectively connect the individual firm total return variation 
with the market-specific factor.  
R
2
 is another proxy of stock price synchronicity because it measures how many 
percentages of the model is explained by the market. The number of R
2
 lies between 0 
and 1. The higher the R
2
, the higher is the synchronicity. 
2.2.2. Synchronicity in developed andemerging markets 
This concept extends the previous theory in stock market. Mrock(2000)found that 
developed markets have less synchronous co-movements in stock markets while in 
emerging markets the co-movements are significant. According to his theory, there are 
three main determinants in explaining potential synchronicity in stock markets: First, 
undiversified firm-level information, information asymmetry can increase stock price 
synchronicity accordingly. The second, developing countries with emerging markets 
have poor protection of private property. The last, poor protections of public investors 
also affects stock price synchronicity. Li et al. (2004) also proved the same idea that 
 12 
 
low- income countries have more relative co-movements in stock markets, but he also 
states there are other factors affecting the synchronicity apart from the size and the 
structure of the entire market. 
Table 2.1 Stock price synchronicity all over the world 
Panel B Panel C 
Country 
% stocks moving 
in step (fj) 
Country  
United States 57.9 United States 0.021 
Canada 58.3 Canada 0.062 
France 59.2 U. K. 0.062 
U. K. 63.1 France 0.075 
Sweden 66.1 Sweden 0.142 
India 69.5 India 0.189 
Greece 69.7 Greece 0.192 
Mexico 71.2 Mexico 0.29 
China 80 China 0.453 
Poland 82.9 Poland 0.569 
Data source: Morck (2010) 
This table demonstrates the stock price synchronicities of ten chosen countries in both 
methods. In this table, I can see developed markets, United States, Canada, France, U. 
K., and Sweden. These five countries have relatively low stock price synchronicity. 
Considering emerging markets as India, Greece, Mexico, China and Poland, the table 
shows comparably high stock price synchronicity. For example, United States has 
57.9% in f and 0.021 as R
2
, but China has 80% co-movements and 0.453 in R
2
. So 
United States has the lowest stock price synchronicity among the countries all over 
the world, and that is why United States is usually marked as benchmark country 
when measuring other countries’ stock price synchronicity. Then he came up with a 
model that compared the target country’s stock price synchronicity with the 
benchmark country America. The American market has been defined as the least 
synchronous equity market all over the world because of its mature trading system 
and professional investors.  Morck calculate a statistic by using the Central Limit 
Theorem to check the difference between target country’s stock price synchronicity 
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and US’s stock price synchronicity.  
(𝑓𝑈𝑆 − 𝑓𝑡)
√𝑓𝑈𝑆(1 − 𝑓𝑈𝑆)/𝑛𝑈𝑆 + 𝑓𝑡(1 − 𝑓𝑡)/𝑛𝑡
 
If this statistic model is not significant, it indicates that the tested country’s stock 
prices is not significant compared with the America’s market, in other words, the 
tested country’s stock prices is not significantly synchronous compared to U. S.. 
However, if the statistic test is significant, then I say the tested country’s stock price is 
significantly synchronous. 
There are many other empirical studies proving this phenomenon. Gilmore and 
McManus (2003) focus on short-term CEE markets Hungary, Poland and the German 
stock markets, while Voronkova (2004) demonstrates the long-term by using daily 
stock market data. Egert and Kocenda (2010) proved that Western Europe markets 
show fewer co-movements while Poland shows more synchronous movements. All 
these results are consistent with Morck’s theory, China’s stock market is the second 
most synchronous market, while Poland is the most synchronous one among all the 
markets.  
2.2.3. Factors affecting synchronicity 
Mrock (2000) analyzed the determinant from the aspects of firm-level information 
and marker-level information and found that emerging markets, compared to 
developed markets, produce less firm specific information. In his study, the dependent 
variables are co-movement f and synchronicity R
2
, and the independent variables are 
macroeconomic volatility, country size, and economy diversification. That firm 
specific information is useful for investors to capture important information to judge 
the potential value of the firm in the future. Weak property rights discourage informed 
trading and thus prevent firm-specific information from being incorporated into stock 
prices (Chan &Hameed, 2005). Besides, Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) state that 
insiders and institutional investors make huge contribution to the produce of 
firm-specific information, and highly analized firm-specific information can reduce 
the stock price synchronization. Joseph and Darren (2004) also investigate three 
informed market participants – financial analysts, institutional investors and insiders. 
They find that synchronicity has a positive relationship with analyst forecasting 
activities and their tests show that institutional trading enlarges the influence of 
firm-specific information of future earnings news on the stock price.  
As Xing and Anderson (2010) analyzed, stock synchronicity can be low in either good 
or bad firm-specific information environments because stock prices incorporate both 
public and private information. Moreover, they provide inversely U-shaped relation 
between synchronicity and public information. Above all these studies, I conclude that 
Morck analyzed macroeconomic and microeconomic variables in interpreting the 
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phenomenon of stock price synchronicity. One important factor he ignored is 
institutional investors’ effects.  
2.3. Firm-specific information 
2.3.1. Private and Public information 
The stock price of an individual firm reflects both market-wide and firm-specific 
information. If a firm exposure more firm-specific information, the R
2
 statistic, which 
is defined as a proxy of stock price synchronicity, would be lower (Xing et al. 2010). 
The stock price of the firm is public, lower stock price synchronicity would be 
accompanying more public firm-specific information, ceteris paribus. Assume that 
high-quality information environment means more public firm-specific information of 
the firms, and then R
2
 may or may not usually reflect this quality. As Chen et al (2007) 
points out, because the stock prices incorporate both private and public information, 
so high-quality information will include both private and public information. 
Considering the inequality of the actual stock prices that consists of both public and 
private information and the amount of firm-specific information the firm generates, 
the higher stock price synchronicity could imply either more or less information the 
market captures in different information systems. And that is where the U-shaped 
relation between synchronicity and public firm-specific information comes from. 
When introducing this U-shaped model of stock price synchronicity and firm-specific 
information, I know that either more or less information leads to high stock price 
synchronicity. 
2.3.2. Synchronicity and firm-specific information 
The firm-specific information is a key element of a market synchronicity. Several 
studies have investigated this character. For a stock market, the firm-specific 
information is a decisive factor of a stock price synchronicity (Warner, 1993). By 
analyzing firms’ annual report, major events and key news, investors are able to 
understand firms’ actual operation situation, like the profitability and debt paying 
ability, so that they have made a more considerate trading decision. There have been 
many papers have researched the importance of firm-specific information analysis 
(Diamond and Verrecchia, 1981). On the other hand, a high firm-specific market also 
means relatively consummate market order, management and laws. For example, in 
an emerging market, the firm-specific information may be less useful to risk 
arbitrageurs because the lack of protection for investors (Morck, 2000; Barclay 2007). 
Similarly, less firm-specific information is produced in emerging market (Chan and 
Hameed, 2005) because that it is too costly and inefficient. These researches above 
imply that the relationship between stock price synchronicity and the produce of 
firm-specific information is negative. 
There are plenty of firm-specific events that investors are highly concerned about. For 
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instance, divestitures, initial public offerings, mergers and acquisitions, stock 
repurchases and seasoned-equity offerings. Based on Colak’s study (2010), stock 
market returns seem to be the most common factor that drives major corporate events. 
Besides, the leverage of the firm, market value of the firm, the number of the firms in 
this industry are also widely used in analyzing the firm’s current performance and 
potentials in the future. 
2.4. Institutional investors 
2.4.1. General definition of institutional investors 
Institutional investors are commonly considered more important than individual 
investors because of their higher level of information and their better technology in 
dealing with financial information, either firm-specific or market information. This 
condition happens both in emerging and developed stock markets. According to 
Piotroski and Roulstone (2005), the actions of insiders, institutional investors, and 
financial analysts generate a continuum of informed trade that influences stock prices. 
And insiders are the most informed group with respect to the firms’ operations. 
As Chan et al (2006) claimed, there are numbers of researchers analyzing developed 
markets in America.Michael, Barclay and Jerold (1993) test NYSE samples and find 
how trade size and institutional features influence the stock prices. An exception is 
Chang et al. (2001), he examine analyst activity both in developed and emerging 
markets, they show that country-specific variables influence both the extent of analyst 
activity and the accuracy of analyst forecasts, and also prove that, the earnings of 
business groups are more difficult to forecast than the earnings of non-business group 
in emerging markets. 
Generally speaking, the institutional investors are commonly treated as the ‘weather 
vane’ of the equity market. Because institutional investors have a large amount of 
investment fund, professional analysts analyze the true value of the company, and 
institutional investors spend more time in the equity market, institutional investors 
have significant effects in stock price compared to individual investors. Considering 
the education, professional background, decision making ability and strain capacity, 
institutional investors are better at interpreting the surplus control behavior (Balsam, 
2002). Concretely, when facing large amount of market or firm information, the 
institutional investors are much better at using them than the individual investors 
(Gompers, 2002). For example, if the information of a listed firm is produced and 
spread by media, the individual investors are more likely “wild” about this stock. On 
the contrary, this feedback rarely happens in institutional investors (Barber, 2003). 
There also many other papers indicate that institutional investors can use firm-specific 
information efficiently and sometimes they are the fabricant of the information (Sloan, 
1996; Zhu, 2007; Hou, 2008). I obtain the tendency of Chinese institutional investors’ 
market proportion from the CSMAR database. It indicates that  institutional 
investors prefer the firms’ stock with high market value and the number of their 
 16 
 
shareholdings is significantly increased. 
2.4.2. Domestic and Foreign institutional investors 
Before analyzing the importance of institutional investors, the difference in 
institutions and the ability in processing information are two key issues. As Bardhan 
(2000) studied, for developing countries, there is less sophisticated market institutions. 
That is the point that institutional investors are important. Moreover, in emerging 
markets, information is necessarily much more based on personal experience, which 
is to some extent explain the scene of high stock price synchronicity problem in 
emerging markets. Frenkel (2004) studied in this field and found the interrelation 
between investors and relevant information. 
In his proposition, the information access of the market within two institutional 
investors can be separated into four groups. And the information quality can be ranked 
in order: 
a. Foreign-Foreign field, foreign institution investors have high technologies in 
dealing with foreign information. The quality of information is ‘high’. 
b. Local-Local field, this is intuitive and the quality of information is ‘good’. 
c. Foreign-Local field, FIIs use their knowledge and ability to interpret local 
information, so the information quality is ‘fair’. 
Figure 2.1 Heterogeneous Distribution and Quality of Information in Emerging Markets 
(Source: Frenkel et al, 2004) 
 
d. Local-Foreign field, DIIs do not have such ability in analyzing poor available 
foreign information, and then its quality is ‘low’. 
The dominance order of these four situations can be ranked as: 
a > b > c > d 
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Based on this theory, the conclusion is obviously that, foreign institutional investors 
can reduce stock price synchronicity in local markets as well as domestic institutional 
investors because they have high technology to deal with information, but they have 
rare access to information than domestic institutional investors. 
Other researchers collect institutional investors’ data from Wind database. The data 
covers the period 2003-2009.Table 2.2 demonstrates the changes of numbers of QFIIs 
and DIIs. 
Table 2.2 Distribution of funds by year (Source: Liu et al, 2012) 
 
QFII 
 
Domestic Fund 
Year No. of QFIIs 
No. of firms 
that QFIIs 
invest in 
 
No. of 
domestic 
funds 
No. of firms that 
domestic funds invest in 
2003 10 17 
 
110 516 
2004 24 35 
 
161 1049 
2005 31 122 
 
218 1062 
2006 44 196 
 
301 1113 
2007 49 154 
 
346 893 
2008 66 124 
 
439 887 
2009 85 210 
 
557 1273 
Mean 44 123 
 
305 970 
All these numbers are issued by CSRC in monthly reports. This table shows the 
number of qualified foreign institutional investors and domestic institutional investors 
in China. Besides, the number of institutional investors is increasing every 
yearexcept2008. That is because of sub-prime financial crisis. And most institutional 
investors are willing to invest in manufacturing industries, technologies and SOEs. 
Besides, FIIs have preference in transportation, metals, chemicals and machinery. 
Only very few foreign institutional investment are related to real estate, construction, 
media and culture. In conclusion, The stock price synchronicity in China should be 
decreasing. 
2.4.3. The effects of institutional investors on stock market 
Institutional investors can affect markets. As Morck (2000) said, the rest of effects of 
his model are dealt by institutional investors. Tao (2009) found larger momentum in 
the stock prices by institutional trading, especially positive-feedback trading can 
move the stock prices further away from their fundamentals, which cause the unstable 
stock price. John, Jeffrey and Selim (2003) present that institutional or individual 
investors have different behaviors . And institutional investors make large amount of 
analysis on firms’ fundamental values to estimate whether the new stock price follows 
its real value. 
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The utilization of firm-specific information affects the price synchronicity, and 
institutional investors are able to make use of it. The relationship between the 
institutional investors and the stock price synchronicity has been studied by Yin 
(2010). He sets institutional investors’ ownership, the changes of institutional 
investors’ shareholdings and the number of institutional investors as the independent 
variables and finds that all these factors have significant role in stock price 
synchronicity. However, the institutional investors can be divided into the DIIs and 
FIIs. As participants of the stock market, both DIIs and FIIs have their own 
advantages and disadvantages. According to Chinese Security Website, the CSRC 
issued the Open-end Securities Investment Fund Pilot Management Approach and in 
the same year the China National Council for Social Security Fund was established. In 
2001, the capital market had the Open-end fund to the public for the first time and it 
replaced the Close-ended fund becoming the mainstream of fund market gradually. 
For foreign institutional investors, in 1994, the Chinese government started to allow 
foreign funds to invest in Chinese capital market, but at that time the FIIs could not 
invest A-share market until the new QFIIs was allowed in China’s markets in 2003. 
QFII is a transition system that the qualified foreign institutional investors can invest 
A-share through this special fund. The number of QFIIs is 169 in 2012 with 374 
hundred million dollar. Therefore, the relationship between stock price synchronicity 
and QFIIs need to be concerned. 
Yin (2010) does a research on the relationship between institutional investors and 
stock price synchronicity. Then he does regression in testing institutional effects, the 
variables are China’s institutional investors’ ownership, the changes of institutional 
investors’ shareholdings and the number of institutional investors. And all these 
variables are significant, and the changes of institutional investors’ shareholdings 
contribute most compared to other two variables. 
 Kim et al (2014) analyze both foreign versus domestic institutional investors in 
emerging markets, and conclude that foreign and domestic short-term institutions in 
emerging markets are more actively involved in information-based trading than 
domestic long-term institutions, and the trading activities of the former facilitate the 
incorporation of idiosyncratic information into stock prices. The stock price 
synchronicity is essentially related with the intensity of trading by foreign and 
domestic investors. 
2.5.Panel Data Analysis 
Panel data analysis is commonly used in analyzing real world effects, and in this 
dissertation, panel data analysis is used as main model specification.  
There are four main attractions of panel data. First of all, panel data admit the 
heterogeneity of countries, firms and products so as to reduce the bias of data. Second, 
panel data covers both time series and cross-sectional factor, providing much more 
information comparing to single cross-section or time series analysis. Third, 
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comparing with time series and cross-sectional models, panel data can detect and 
measure errors better, and panel data is suitable for more complicated behavioral 
models. 
There are three main models in analyzing panel data: pooled regression, fixed effects 
model and random effects model. The simplest way to estimate panel data would be 
estimating a single, pooled regression on all the observations together. And the 
equation of pooling is: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =∝  +𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 
All data in pool regression is cross-sectional data, and thereby comes the problem, 
there might be heterogeneity, simply ‘pretending’ there is no dependence between 
observations on a variable and information lost. So pooling regression is intuitively 
implausible for my model.  
In order to avoid biases when running the regression, I need more precise models in 
dealing with panel data. One is fixed effects model (FE model), and the other is 
random effects model (RE model). Fixed effects model for cross-sectional dimension 
and time series dimension allows some constant factors do not vary either across 
firms or across time. The fixed effects model is defined as: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
In fixed effects model, it can be understood as introducing different intercept terms 
for each CSU. And additionally, the fixed effects model can also been treated as 
introducing dummy variable in each unit. Moreover, the fixed effects can be used both 
in cross sectional and periodically dimension. 
An alternative to the fixed effects model is the random effects model. Here presents 
the random effects model: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ =∝∗+ 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝜇𝑖𝑡
∗  
The random effects model requires that there is no remaining correlation in the error 
terms. Comparing the fixed effects model, random effects model is generally efficient 
than fixed effect model because of fewer estimated parameters and the avoidance of 
the correlation of errors within CSU’s. The problem is that the RE model has more 
strict assumptions. Sometimes, the empirical data does not satisfy the requirement of 
RE model. Random effects model can apply to both dimensions only if the panel data 
is balanced, so does mixed effects model. 
After choosing the fixed effects or random effects, the tests are required to test 
whether the model is suitable. The redundant fixed effects test is used to test if the 
fixed effects model can be used. Meanwhile, Hausman test in the Eveiws program 
applies for test of random effects model.  
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3. Hypotheses development 
Since the establishment of China’s Stock Market in 1989, the DIIs have developed as 
an increasing proportion in the main body of investment. In the early age of Stock 
Secondary Market, the institutional investor is scarce inthe market. In 1997, the total 
number of Chinese stock account is 17,130 million, which includes 99.7% individual 
investors and only 0.3% institutional investors. However, these numbers became 
47.84% and 52.16% respectively in 2009. 
The total size of fund in Chinese financial market is 21 trillion in 2014. Qi, Huang and 
Chen (2005) do a research about the development of Chinese DIIs and find that the 
DIIs offer a significant boost for the decreasing of market volatility. By researching 
the ‘bear market’ of NASDAQ in 2000, Fougere and Shawky(2003) find DIIs own 
more low volatility stocks than the individual investors. There are some other papers 
proving this conclusion indirectly. Arbel, Carvel and Strebel(1983) and Comper and 
Metrick(2001) find the negative relationship between the institutional investors’ 
ownership and the company size, which can be explained that DIIs disgust the firms 
with high risk, in other words, the small size firms. 
Domestic institutional investors are apparently having their own superiorities in an 
emerging market. Firstly, the domestic policy superiority can straightly effect the 
invest scale and items of the two groups (Cai, 2011; Busse and Hefeken, 2007). In this 
paper, the writer expounds an emerging stock market’s policy development and lists 
the effects of several fatal policy changes. Secondly, domestic investors are more 
acquainted with native market status than foreign investors (Barrell and Pain, 2008). 
The availability to new further information and interpersonal relationship are 
considered when I study this superiority, which is related to the cost control (Callen, 
Hope and Segal, 2005). The foreign institutional investors have higher costs to 
capture key information so that they are more likely to miss great trading or investing 
opportunity. Therefore, domestic institutional investors have inborn advantages and 
they can take use of them to make professional and reasonable trading so as to affect 
the market price synchronicity. 
The stock price synchronicity is a concave function of China’s domestic institutional 
investors’ ownership and the changes of domestic institutional investors’ 
shareholdings, since firm-specific information dominates the price synchronicity. 
Moreover, institutional investors, especially the domestic institutional investors, can 
take use of the information and they can promote each other. Finally, the domestic 
institutional investors may reduce the stock price synchronicity through firm-specific 
information. I thus test the following hypothesis: 
H1a: Stock price synchronicity is negatively related to the domestic 
institutional investors’ ownership. 
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H1b: Stock price synchronicity is negatively related to the changes of 
domestic institutional investors’ shareholdings. 
Since Chinese government joined WTO, the government opened part of financial 
markets where not only FIIs (foreign institutional investors), but also QFIIs can invest 
in Chinese securities market. (Greenaway et al. 2011). Investment volume in 2010 is 
$19 billion compared to the beginning of the scheme in 2003, and by the end of 
September that year, about 93 QFIIs had been approved by the CSRC. QFIIs had 
become important participants in Chinese securities markets. 
FIIs are interested in investing in emerging markets with fast-growing economy, and 
they have been the most important source of capital for emerging markets (Frenkel et 
al, 2004). According to Kang and Stulz(1997) and Dahlquist and Robertsson(2001), 
who analyzed data from Japan and Sweden respectively, their research showed 
foreign investors prefer holding more shares of manufacturing firms, larger firms, and 
firms with low unsystematic risk, low leverage, and those with large cash position. 
Covrig et al. (2006) proved that foreign investors tend to overweight stocks that are 
globally well known, while domestic investors prefer stocks with large dividended 
payouts. Other US markets researchers, Aggarwal et al. (2005), Bradshaw et al. (2004) 
and Leuz et al. (2009) provided similar theories. All these studies suggest that 
foreigners prefer to invest in stocks with less uncertain information to overcome their 
information disadvantages. 
According to  Chinese market, SOEs earned lots of attention because they canget 
large state subsidies and preferential financing, taxes and regulations, which is 
consistent with Bussey’s (2012) theory. The SOEs are ruled and controlled by the 
Chinese government. Considering this, FIIs are interested in investing in these stocks 
since these stocks are easily predictable comparing to other stocks. SOEs are intensive 
in A shares and H shares, in our analysis, I only focus on analyzing foreign investors’ 
effects in A shares. Based on Yin’s (2010) research on institutional investors’ effect on 
stock synchronicity, the amounts of institutional investors’ shareholdings and 
changing amounts of institutional investors’ shareholdings are negatively associated 
with the stock synchronicity, thus I come up the following hypotheses related to 
foreign investors and stock synchronicity:: 
H2a: The amounts of foreign institutional investors’ shareholdings are 
negatively associated with the stock synchronicity. 
H2b: The changing foreign amounts of institutional investors’ shareholdings 
are negatively associated with the stock synchronicity. 
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4. Methodology 
4.1.Data collection method 
I collect the fundamental data from the DataStream database, which includes all the 
listed firms’ daily stock prices（2007-2012） of SSE. The shareholding ratio of 
institutional investors, ROEs (return of equity) and leverage from Wind database. And 
the information of GDP is collected from NBSC. For all the stock prices data in the 
sample, I firstly sift it and remove some meaningless data for further analysis by 
following these rules: (1) delete the yearly data whose actual trading days are less 
than 150 days; (2) delete all the listed financial firms; (3) delete the firms with major 
assets restructuring; (4) delete the firms with missing data, and (5) delete the firms 
whose shareholding of QFIIs is less than 12 quarters. 
4.2.Stock price synchronicity 
For the measure to estimate stock price synchronicity I follow Morck (2000), Yeung 
and Yu (2000) and use the 𝑅2 statistic from the market model. Usually a high 
synchronicity market has a high 𝑅2. In the market model, Ferdinand, Jeong-Bon and 
Annie (2010) and Yin (2010) divided the total return variation into market part and 
industry part. However, the problem when this method is used in the emerging market 
is that it is difficult to distinguish the industry effect from the market effect, and when 
getting the calculation results, it can only reflect the firm-specific information rather 
than the industry-specific information (Kalok and Allaudeen, 2005). Therefore, I 
chose the single variable regression. The following market model for each fiscal year 
is: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖                       (1) 
where, for firm 𝑖 and day 𝑡, 𝑅𝑚 is the A-share market return that is calculated by 
the A-share market index, 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the individual stock daily return and 𝜀 represents 
the random errors. This A-share market return is from the official daily announcement. 
The equation above let us effectively connect the individual firm total return variation 
with the market-specific factor. 
After finishing the return regression, I will get series 𝑅2 from series regression 
equations. However, these 𝑅2s are bounded between [0, 1], so they are not good 
enough to be the dependent variables. There is potential problem with the standard 
R-square, because standard R-square will increase with the complexity of the model. 
So generally I always use adjusted R-square instead. Generally adjusted R-square is 
smaller than standard R-square. The transformation equation is: 
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Adjusted 𝑅2 = 1 −  
(1 − 𝑅2) ∗ (𝑛 − 1)
𝑛 − 𝑝 − 1
 
In the equation, n is the number of observations, p is the number of predictors, in this 
case, p equals one. Therefore, I use a standard econometric remedy and apply the 
logistic transformations to these variables. By doing this step, the transformation is: 
SYNCHi,t = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(
𝑅2
1−𝑅2
)                      (2) 
where 𝑅2  is from the equation (1) for firm 𝑖  and year 𝑡 . According to this 
transformation, the measurement of stock price synchronicity becomes continuous. 
𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡  is the measure of stock price synchronicity for firm 𝑖. A high 𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝐻 
implies that the highly correlation between the individual firm and the market. 
4.3.Empirical Model 
In order to examine the effect of related issues related shareholdings by foreign versus 
domestic institutional investors on stock price synchronicity, I estimate the following 
panel regression model: 
Synch𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐0 +  𝑐1𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡 +  𝑐2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐3𝑆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐4𝐿𝑛 𝑀𝑉 +
                                         𝑐5𝐿𝑛 𝑁𝑢𝑚 + 𝑐6𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖                             (3) 
Where Synchi,t is logistically transformed price synchronicity variables, and it is 
explained variable. One the right side of the above regression model, I set some 
explanatory and control variables: 
Lnyt represents per capita GDP at time t. Stock prices move together more in 
emerging markets with relatively low GDP, and there exists a negative relation 
between per capita GDP and stock price synchronicity. I take logistical transformation 
of per capita GDP as one control variable. The coefficient of this variable should be 
negative. 
Levi,t is the leverage of the firm i at time t. A firm’s leverage ratio is total liabilities 
divided by total assets. To some extent, leverage shows the potential financial risk of 
the firm in the future, and it is one considerable factor of institutional investors.  
SROAi,t, is the standard deviation of return on asset of firm at time t. Piotroski’s (2004) 
research have investigated the inversely related relationship between SROA and stock 
price synchronicity. SROA is measured by the standard deviation of ROA at t-1, t and 
t+1. As Yin (2010) demonstrates, within the increasing in the variance of the firm’s 
profitability, the correlation between the firm-level operating and the tendency of the 
market is decreasing. The higher the variance in ROA, the less the synchronicity 
reflected in stock prices. So the coefficient of this variable is expected to negative. 
LnMV: the log form of market value of the firm, this indicator can be used as a tool to 
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measure easy-to-ignore firm-specific information. This is a widely used firm indicator 
because it connects with other firm specific information, and the difference between 
information would affect stock price synchronicity. On the other hand, huge 
enterprises can lead the development direction of the whole industry, and investors 
purchase in these firms for long period holding. In this sense, the changes in stock 
prices will lead to low synchronous in the market, so this coefficient should be 
negative. 
LnNum: the log form of the company numbers in this industry. The lower numbers of 
the firms in this industry, the higher the stock price synchronicity would be. So in this 
case, the coefficient of this variable should be negative as well. 
xi,t are the explanatory variables I set to test the effects of both domestic and foreign 
institutional investors, and it includes four variables: D-Inst-Hi,t, D-Inst-Ci,t, F-Inst-Hi,t, 
and F-Inst-Ci,t. According to the previous research of institutional investors, I predict 
the coefficients of all these explanatory variables are negative 
Domestic institutional investors shareholdings: D-Inst-Hi,t, which is calculated by 
(percentage of shares DIIs hold at the beginning of time t+ percentage of shares DIIs 
hold at the end of time t)/2. 
Changes of domestic institutional investors shareholdings: D-Inst-Ci,t which is 
calculated by the percentage of changes of domestic institutional investors’ 
shareholdings of firm i at time t. 
Foreign institutional investors shareholdings: F-Inst-Hi,t which is calculated by 
(percentage of shares FIIs hold at the beginning of time t+ percentage of shares FIIs 
hold at the end of time t)/2. 
Changes of foreign institutional investors shareholdings: F-Inst-Ci,t which is 
calculated by the percentage of changes of foreign institutional investors’ 
shareholdings of firm i at time t. 
  
 25 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Data 
In this part, I collect a set of different information bundles from several sources. The 
data consists of three main parts: stock return of 1228 firms that listed in China’s 
Shanghai stock exchange and Shanghai composite index during 2007-2012; 
firm-specific information, such as leverage, ROA and MV, macro and structure 
variables GDP and Number of firms in this industry and finally institutional investors’ 
relevant information (holding of particular of firms and the shareholding changing 
during the same time period of stocks. All data is listed in the following table: 
Table 5.1 Sources of the database 
Data type Data description Source 
Ri Stock return of individual firm from 2007-2012 Datastream 
Rm Stock return of Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2007-2012 Datastream 
GDP Gross Domestic Product NBSC
3
 
Lev Leverage of the firm: D/E Wind 
ROA Return on Assets Wind 
MV Market value of the firm Datastream 
Num Number of firms in the same industry Datastream 
D_Inst_C Domestic institutional changes in shareholdings Wind 
D_Inst_H Domestic institutional shareholdings of stocks Wind 
F_Inst_C Foreign institutional changes in shareholdings Wind 
F_Inst_H Foreign institutional shareholdings of stocks Wind 
The stock prices of firms are daily data, and the rest of the data are quarterly. After 
collecting data from these sources, these data are transformed into the form I need for 
further analysis.  
 
                                                             
3 National Bureau of Statistics of China 
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5.2. Stock price synchronicity 
Table 6.2 presents the R-square of all the stocks listed in SSE. The R
2
 statistics refer 
to the coefficient of determination for Equation (1). As shown in this table, I see that, 
on average, R
2 
is approximately 35.96% that explained the markets, and the median is 
nearly 37.13%. As Morck (2000) studies, in 1994, the R
2
 in Chinese equity market is 
around 45.3%, and Yin (2010) points out with the development of the market, the R
2
 
decreases to 41.94%. Without any doubt, this trend is positive and which represents 
the maturity of the Chinese markets. 
Table 5.2 R
2 
of the firms in the sample period 
R
2
 Mean Std.Dev Minimum Median Maximum 
2007 0.2745 0.1180 0.0031 0.2912 0.5863 
2008 0.4880 0.1400 0.0072 0.5064 0.8056 
2009 0.3694 0.1249 0.0013 0.3687 0.7162 
2010 0.3215 0.1350 0.0041 0.3062 0.7629 
2011 0.3491 0.1311 0.0091 0.3407 0.7124 
2012 0.3777 0.1562 0.0110 0.3820 0.7931 
2007-2012 0.3596 0.1064 0.0025 0.3713 0.6440 
I also separate the stock prices into six years, and make regressions again and record 
R
2
 for each year. The value of R
2
 in 2007, which is about 27.45%, shows the lowest 
stock price synchronicity. While in 2008, the R
2
 is the highest among all these years 
because it rockets to 48.8%. In the coming four years, the stock price synchronicity 
decreases and remains constant with little fluctuation. As Figure 5.1 illustrates, I can 
figure out this time-varying-changes clearly.  
Figure 5.1 R
2
 of SSE in different years 
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In 2007, the equity market in China shows prosperity, the earnings rate of the whole 
markets reached up to 50 times, both institutional and individual investors actively 
involved in trading, so the stock price synchronicity is the lowest. While during the 
end of 2007, the A-share markets collapsed x because of the sub-prime crisis, many 
investment institutions bankrupted and individual investors left the equity markets, so 
the markets were highly affected by those huge companies who survived during this 
period. And that is the reason why the stock price synchronicity went up in 2008. The 
rest four years show the aftermath of sub-prime crisis. With the recovery of the 
economy in the whole world, investors come back into the equity markets again, and 
this reduced the stock price synchronicity gradually and turned the whole markets into 
stable with predictable fluctuation. 
5.3. Foreign institutional investors 
The primary data type of foreign institutional investors is the shareholdings of the 
stocks in SSE. Based on this information I can rearrange it into different forms. 
According to the companies foreign institutional investors invested in, I capture 
favorite companies they invest, and get the industry preference of foreign institutional 
investors. As Figure 6.2 show, machinery, chemicals, metals and transportation firms 
represents 26%, 23%, 22% and 15% respectively. And these industries are those 
foreign institutional investors would love to invest in. This result is perfectly fitted 
with Liu’s research that his analysis indicates that FIIs have preference in 
transportation, metals, chemicals and machinery. The other fields are real estate, 
media and financial sectors, but these industries only play little weights in FIIs’ 
investment strategy, because these industries are more volatile and easily replaced. As 
the proposition that foreign institutional investors would not invest in high risk 
industries, this phenomenon is reasonable. 
Figure 5.2 Foreign institutional investment preferences 
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Then the time effects on foreign institutional investors are processed. I collect the 
quarterly data of the firms whose shares are held by foreign institutions, and compare 
materials with the stock price synchronicity during the same period. The results are as 
Figure 6.3 shows. 
Figure 6.3 Foreign Investment and R
2
 of the market 
  
In this figure, the blue line is the number of firms foreign institutional investors 
invested in each period, the unit lies on the left axis. Meanwhile, the red line is the 
stock price synchronicity index: R
2
. Cause the data of numbers of firms is quarterly 
but R
2
 of the market is yearly data, so the red line in the figure has horizontal lines in 
each year. Intuitively, because of sub-prime crisis since 2007-2008, foreign 
institutional investors left China’s equity markets. Along with the divestments, the 
firms that FIIs invested in are reducing as well. Conversely, the R2 goes up 
significantly. After years, FIIs started to reinvest in China’s equity markets, then the 
number of firms that invested in were rising up, on the opposite, the R2 decreased 
accordingly. This contradiction happens all the time. This is consistent with our 
hypotheses that foreign investment has negative correlated with the stock price 
synchronicity. Next part would find out the correlation between these two indicators 
statistically. 
5.4. Descriptive statistics 
After rearrange the data, I get all the required type of data of the empirical model, and 
Table 6.3 reports the descriptive statistics of these data. 
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Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics of panel model 
Variables Mean Std.Dev Minimum Median Maximum 
Dependent Variables: 
     
Synch -0.436 0.930 -5.853 -0.368 1.660 
Explanatory Variables: 
     
D_Inst_H 15.97% 15.96% 0.00% 11.64% 94.86% 
D_Inst_C 25.00% 139.98% -100.00% -3.03% 2222.46% 
F_Inst_H 1.68% 2.41% 0.00% 0.83% 19.96% 
F_Inst_C 5.47% 73.44% -100.00% -0.01% 953.39% 
Control Variables: 
     
SROA 0.0243 0.0285 0.0005 0.0154 0.2312 
LnY 8.7958 0.2417 8.3835 8.8436 9.2844 
LnMV 9.3363 1.2168 6.4029 9.1100 14.059 
Lev 0.4995 0.1995 0.0501 0.4996 0.9204 
LnNUM 4.6135 0.6834 2.8904 4.7449 5.6021 
Observations 1055 
    
I have 1055 observations in our model, and three types of variables: dependent 
variables, explanatory variables, and control variables. Synch, is the transformation 
type of R-square. This transformation reduces the drawback of R
2
 that is not 
continuous distributed. The mean and median of synch is -0.436 and -0.368. Secondly, 
D_Inst_H, D_Inst_C, F_Inst_H and F_Inst_C are explanatory variables. D_Inst_H 
and F_Inst_H were coming up by Yin (2010). These are shareholdings of domestic 
and foreign institutional investors. Yin also mentioned changes of shareholdings. The 
explanation of this variable is not exactly same as Yin’s. He putted focus on the 
changes of stocks of institutional investors over whole changing stocks. I emphasize 
on the shareholding changes of institutional investors in one time compared to their 
own shareholdings last time joint point. The third, control variables, SROA, LnY, 
LnMV, Lev and LnNUM are structural variables that either directly or indirectly 
affect the firms. GDP, MV and NUM are used as logged form. The log transformation 
can make the value smaller without changing the characteristics and reduce the 
probability of heteroskedasticity. The mean and median of SROA are 0.0243 and 
0.0154, while the mean and median of Lev are 0.4995 and 0.4996. Smaller the 
distance between mean and median means a higher fitness as a normal distribution. 
The mean and median of rest three control variables have larger gap and according to 
Jarque-Bera test, they are significantly not normal distributed, which will affect the 
results of the empirical model. Fortunately, large observations can reduce the 
disadvantage of non-normality problem. 
In order to find out the correlation between the variables, I made a correlation matrix 
of all the variables. As Table 6.4 demonstrates, all four explanatory variables 
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Table 5.4 Covariance &Correlation Matrix  
Covariance 
SYNCH SROA LNY LNMV D_INST_H D_INST_C F_INST_C F_INST_H LEV LNNUM 
Correlation 
SYNCH 0.864 
         
 
1.000 
         
SROA -0.003 0.001 
        
 
-0.119 1.000 
        
LNY -0.006 0.002 0.058 
       
 
-0.028 0.253*** 1.000 
       
LNMV 0.132 0.002 0.013 1.479 
      
 
0.117*** 0.062** 0.043 1.000 
      
D_INST_H -0.017 0.000 -0.005 0.044 0.026 
     
 
-0.117** -0.037 -0.117 0.227*** 1.000 
     
D_INST_C -0.048 -0.002 0.010 -0.002 0.028 1.958 
    
 
-0.037 -0.047 0.031 -0.001 0.123*** 1.000 
    
F_INST_C -0.013 0.000 -0.006 0.006 -0.010 0.060 0.539 
   
 
-0.019 -0.021 -0.032 0.006 -0.085 0.059 1.000 
   
F_INST_H -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.001 
  
 
-0.074* -0.116 -0.174 -0.173* 0.044 0.020 0.232*** 1.000 
  
LEV -0.007 0.001 0.001 0.056 0.004 0.005 -0.001 0.000 0.040 
 
 
-0.038 0.080*** 0.020 0.231*** 0.130*** 0.017 -0.008 -0.048 1.000 
 
LNNUM -0.078 0.000 0.000 -0.047 0.011 -0.062 0.009 0.000 0.044 0.467 
 
-0.123*** 0.019 -0.001 -0.056 0.100*** -0.065 0.018 -0.002 0.322*** 1.000 
*, **, *** shows the variable is significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level respectively 
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have negative correlation regarding to Synch, and D_INST_H and F_INST_H are 
significant at 5% and 10% respectively. Moreover, the number of firms in the same 
industry shows significant negative correlation with Synch at 1% confidence level, 
this means within the increasing number in the industry, the stock price synchronicity 
will decrease, and this is an agreement of the theories I talked about in section 2. 
Though logged form of market value of the firm is significantly and positively 
correlated with Synth, based on Xing’s inversely U-shaped model, more or less firm 
specific information can reduce the stock price synchronicity.  
Moreover, firm specific information will affect the investment strategy of institutional 
investors. Market value of the firms, leverage and number of firms in the industry are 
significantly affecting the domestic institutional holdings at 1% confidence level. 
Considering about foreign institutional investors, non-firm-specific information is 
significantly correlated. This result is consistent with Frenkel’s information 
dominance system. Foreign investors have high technologies and they are good at 
analyzing the information they got, but local institutional investors have easy access 
to local information, so the information plays a more important role in domestic 
institutional investors’ strategy. 
Last but not least, some other variables also show strong correlation, such as Lev and 
SROA, this is intuitive that within the leverage of the firm going up, the risk of 
financial distress of the firm goes up as well, and then investors would balance 
whether to invest or divestment and these trading behavior leads to high volatility. 
Others like Num and Lev, MV and Lev are also related to the theory of corporate 
finance. 
5.5. Regression results 
Following the research method of Yin (2010), I run the empirical model five times, 
four as univariate regression and one as multivariate regression. The reason is that I 
have four explanatory variables, and I want to see how single explanatory variable 
could explain the model, so I run single regression for explanatory variable once for 
each, and remain all the control variables constant. And then I run the multivariate 
model to see if previous variables are still significant enough to explain the stock 
price synchronicity. Table 6.4 demonstrates the results of all the five models. 
In the table, each cell has two numbers inside. The above one is the coefficient of 
variable, and the below one is the t value. First of all, the data are just running as pool 
regression. Pool regression shows limited ability to explain the model, So the models 
in tables 5.5 are all using fixed effects model in cross-section dimension and none 
remedies in period dimension because of unbalanced data. The choice of model 
depends on redundant fixed effects model (or likelihood ratio test) and correlated 
random effects (or Hausman test).  
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Because of unbalanced database, the model can choose both fixed effects model, 
random effects either in cross-sectional and period dimension. These tests mentioned 
above are applied, and the results of tests list in Appendix C.  
First, double fixed effects model is tested, according to the results all 5 models reject 
the null hypotheses in cross-sectional dimension and accept in period dimension, so I 
use fixed effects in cross-sectional dimension. Theoretically, random effects model 
has harder restriction and better ability in explanation. If Hausman test is accepted, I 
should use random effects model. After tests, Hausman tests are all rejected. So the 
model I used is fixed effects in cross-sectional dimension and no remedies in period 
dimension.  
Table 5.5 Univariate and Multivariate regression results 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
C 3.0745  3.625151 3.1132  3.5494  4.0873  
 
2.75*** 3.25*** 2.78*** 3.11*** -3.59*** 
SROA 0.3974  -0.0587  0.4588  0.3091  -0.2585  
 
0.36 -0.05 0.42 0.28 -0.24 
LnY -0.0330  -0.1056  -0.0490  -0.079637 -0.1431  
 
-0.29 -0.94 -0.44 -0.70 -1.25 
LnMV -0.3312  -0.3131  -0.3203  -0.3338  -0.3222  
 
-4.75*** -4.52*** -4.57*** -4.78*** -4.62*** 
Lev -0.2646  -0.1120  -0.2748  -0.266881 -0.1054  
 
-0.72 -0.30 -0.74 -0.72 -0.28 
LnNum -0.1490  -0.1239  -0.1436  -0.1446  -0.1287  
 
-3.39*** -2.84*** -3.27*** -3.31*** -2.94*** 
D_Inst_C -0.0320  
   
-0.0162  
 
-1.69* 
   
-0.84 
D_Inst_H 
 
-0.9523  
  
-0.9290  
  
-4.13*** 
  
-3.90*** 
F_Inst_C 
  
-0.0197  
 
-0.0159  
   
-0.56 
 
-0.43 
F_Inst_H 
   
-2.5648  -2.6141  
    
-1.98** -1.97** 
Adj. R
2
 19.31% 20.43% 19.10% 19.39% 20.61% 
*, **, *** shows the variable is significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level respectively 
According to correlation matrix of the variables, D_Inst_C and D_Inst_H have strong 
inter-correlation, while F_Inst_C and F_Inst_C also correlated highly at 1% confidence 
interval. So I extract the results and analyze them into two bundles. The model 1 and the 
model 2 are analyzed as one bundle and the model 3 and the model 4 as another bundle. 
The model 1 explains the stock price synchronicity that explained by domestic 
institutional investors’ changes in shareholdings. In this model, the coefficient of this 
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variable is -0.032, and it is significant at 10% confidence level. This means the 
shareholding changes of institutional investors have some effects in reducing the 
stock price synchronicity to some extent. However, domestic institutional investors’ 
shareholdings in model 2 are much more important than the first one. The coefficient 
is -0.9523, which is larger than -0.032, and it is significant at 1% confidence level.  
In model 3, I analyze the effects of foreign institutional investors’ changes of 
shareholdings and the stock price synchronicity. The coefficient of this variable is 
-0.0197, and it is not significant even at 10% confidence interval, so I can conclude 
that investors in the market don’t really care about foreign institutional investors’ 
trading behaviors. On the contrary, in the model 4, foreign institutional investors’ 
shareholdings is significant at 5% confidence interval, and the absolute value of its 
coefficient is -2.5648 that ranks the highest above all four explanatory variable 
Above all these four models, the absolute value of coefficient of foreign institutional 
investors’ shareholding is the highest, but the variable of domestic institutional 
investors’ shareholding is the most significant one that reduces stock price 
synchronicity. This information proved Frenkel’s assumption. Though foreign 
institutional investors have high technology and better knowledge in dealing with 
available information, which can reduce the stock price synchronicity and stable the 
market, domestic institutional investors have larger effects in reducing the stock price 
synchronicity in local equity markets. As I have mentioned in previous research, the 
position of foreign institutional investors is in c and position of domestic institutional 
investors is in b. Based on Frenkel’s dominance theory, b is dominant over c. Thus our 
empirical results are consistent with theory: Domestic institutional investors play 
more critical role than foreign institutional investors in reducing local equity market’s 
stock price synchronicity.  
Then I run the multivariate regression again within all explanatory variables. When 
including all these variables, the variable D_Inst_C is no longer significant (t value is 
-1.69 and -0.84). The variable F_Inst_C remains insignificant. But D_Inst_H and 
F_Inst_H are still significant at 1% (t value is -4.13) and 5% (t value is -1.97) 
confidence level. This result illustrates the same fact as I talked about: Domestic and 
foreign institutional investors’ shareholdings are the most significant variables among 
them. The adjusted R
2
 is 20.61% for the multivariate regression, and 19.31%, 20.43%, 
19.10% and 19.39% for each model respectively. The model with D_Inst_H is closest 
to the multivariate regression model, and that with F_Inst_H ranks second. This 
condition points out the same result as t-statistic value, the higher adjusted R
2
, and 
better explanation of the whole model. 
After analysis of correlation matrix and regressions of all models, the hypotheses  
are all rejected; all four explanatory variables show negative correlation with stock 
price synchronicity. Among those, domestic and foreign institutional investors’ 
shareholdings are significant at 1% and 5% respectively.  
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The results showed that the stock price synchronicity would be lower for those 
companies with relatively high equity holdings by domestic and foreign institutional 
investors. Those investors also concerns about the trading behavior of domestic 
institutional investors to some extent, but they are not highly interested in foreign 
institutional investors’ trading activities. According to the coefficient of the variables, 
all four explanatory variables negatively affect stock price synchronicity, which is 
consistent with our hypotheses, Moreover, firm-specific information also affects stock 
price synchronicity, institutional investors collect these data and translate these data 
into the form they need, and the trading behavior that containing firm-specific 
information is fit with the institutional investors’ investment expectation. As the 
concept said by Warren Buffett ‘Value investment’, institutional investors’ investment 
strategy is to create value, which will affect stock price synchronicity accordingly.  
The answers of research questions are subsequently clear. The stock price 
synchronicity in SSE is decreasing gradually, except the year of financial crisis. Some 
of firm-specific information is significantly affecting stock price synchronicity while 
others are not. Among all four explanatory variables, shareholdings of DIIs and FIIs 
are playing critical role in SSE. 
5.6. Robustness check method 
In ideal circumstance, the sample size should be infinite, I can only deal with limited 
data, and during the choosing period, I transform raw data into the variables losing 
some of them, this will also affect our results. In the procedure of robustness checks, 
different methods are used to test the stability and the generality of the model. Some 
variables in the regression model may not be stable of the stock price synchronicity, 
so I transfer the variables into other forms, which will not change its characteristics. 
For instance, I change the variable per capita GDP into variations of per capita GDP 
to check if the correlation of the variables in the regression remains the same. so the 
sample size is limited. In ideal circumstance, the sample size should be infinite, I can 
only deal with limited data, and during the choosing period, I transform raw data into 
the variables I use in the model that lose some of them. As I add variables to the 
model, the available degrees of freedom exhausted quickly. For example, SROA is the 
standard deviation of return on assets at t-1, t and t+1, so for each firm in the sample 
loses two degrees of freedom at the beginning and the last.  
5.6.1. Univariate and multivariate regression 
Running regression of explanatory variables separately is one of the robustness check 
method. Because there are four explanatory variables in the model, so after running 
the multivariate regression, I run univariate regression four times to check if the 
model shows the same results. And I find out that most explanatory variables and 
control variables are at the same significance level. Then our results are not 
qualitatively affected. 
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5.6.2. Time period effects 
One way to check whether our results are due to transitory time effects is to repeat our 
regressions by using data of each year. In this paper, the time period is 2007 to 2012, I 
run regressions for each year, and obtain identical conclusions, the only matter is the 
changing of the coefficients of the variables. 
The major transitory event is at the end of 2007, the great depreciation in China’s 
equity markets and the sub-prime crisis. The depreciation might be the aftermath of 
the financial crisis. In year 2008, the R-square is relatively higher than the rest of 
years, and which affects the investment strategy of institutional investors’ strategy. 
Fortunately, the negatively correlated relation between stock price synchronicity and 
institutional investors remains the same. 
5.6.3. Additional variables: small institutions.  
Based on literatures, some researchers found that small institutions are also players in 
equity markets. So I collect data of small institutions as well as domestic & foreign 
institutional investors. The variables are small institutional investors’ shareholdings, 
and the changes of shareholdings of small institutional investors. After running the 
multivariate regression within all the variables, I found that these both variables do 
have negatively relationship but the p-values are not significant enough. That is the 
reason that I abandon small institutions as target of analysis.  
5.6.4. Alternative measurement of variables 
As described before, the variables can be transformed into other forms by 
construction. In the main empirical model, some of variables have already been 
transformed into logged form, for instance, the GDP, number of firms in this industry, 
and the market value of firms. After regressions for the original form of the variables, 
the property of the variables does not change, only the coefficient of those variables 
become smaller. Thus I got identical results. 
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6. Conclusion 
Plenty of previous studies have studied stock price synchronicity in developed 
markets and emerging markets. There are two main branches: effects of firm-specific 
information and effects of institutional investors. Unfortunately, the study of China’s 
equity market is ambiguous. Because of China’s specialty, general concepts cannot 
explain the stock price synchronicity well. This paper brings a fresh perspective in 
understanding the China’s equity market. The first part of this dissertation focuses on 
the stock price synchronicity of SSE, and the second part states DIIs and QFIIs’ 
effects on the stock price synchronicity in China. 
The results of stock price synchronicity are fit with our expectations. The R
2
 was 
increasing during the great depression in 2007 and sub-prime crisis, and it was 
decreasing afterwards and then remaining stable. The average of R
2
 of all years is 
35.96%, which is lower than the value 45.3% (Morck, 2000) and 41.94% (Yin, 2010). 
This trend is optimistic for Chinese investors because the equity market is becoming 
mature stepwise. 
Based on Xing’s inversely U-shaped model (2010), firm-specific information do 
affect stock price synchronicity to some extent. A matching-based strategy is used in 
order to address this problem, and in consideration of regression results, the market 
value of the firm and the number of firms in the same industry are significant, while 
standard deviation of return on assets and leverage of the firms are not. However, 
leverage and SROA have indirect effects on stock price synchronicity since these two 
variables are significantly correlated with institutional investors’ shareholdings, and 
institutional investors’ shareholdings are highly significant with stock price 
synchronicity.  
The most remarkable characteristic of institutional investors in affecting stock price 
synchronicity is the shareholding of the stocks of each firm. Empirical results 
illustrate that domestic institutional investors have impressive negative effects in 
diminishing stock price synchronicity, followed by foreign institutional investors’ 
shareholdings. This is consistent with Frenkel’s (2004) information dominance system 
between domestic and foreign institutional investors. 
Concerning the results,  local institutional investors are ‘weather vane’ of the whole 
market, because domestic institutions have advantages in investing in China’s equity 
markets. First of all, CSRC publishes some of security policies in protecting local 
investors, either institutional or individual investors. Foreign institution investors have 
limitations that they cannot invest in all asset classes in China. Secondly, though 
foreign institutional investors have high technologies and better knowledge, domestic 
institutional investors have easy access to local information, and they can react 
quickly to the sensitivities. Thirdly, domestic institutional investors have larger fund 
than foreign institutional investors correspondingly. China’s equity markets are the 
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main ‘battlefield’ for local investors, since FIIs cannot and will not invest all their 
funds in an emerging markets like China, because emerging markets have larger risks 
than developed markets. 
In a view to empirical results, there awesome suggestion for participants in China’s 
market. For those individual investors who use ‘value-based investment’, will hold 
the stocks for a long period, and they can follow the investment strategy of 
institutional investors, especially local institutional investors. For those who prefer 
speculative trading in the market, should purposely hold the stocks of those firms with 
huge shareholdings as relatively lower-risky investment, and purchase some of stocks 
that institutional investors do not invest in. For domestic institutional investors, 
collecting and interpreting of foreign institutional investors’ investment strategy might 
help with their expanding. For foreign institutional investors, collecting domestic 
institutional investors’ shareholdings of firms is one valuable task, because DIIs are 
efficient in applying local information. For firms, moderate exposure of firm’s 
information can affect the stock price synchronicity of themselves and relatively 
higher effects in their industry. With regard to investors’ reaction to the exposed 
information, firms can evaluate the strategies they make. 
The contribution of this paper lies in three aspects. First, the results indicate an 
optimistic phenomenon that the stock price synchronicity is decreasing in a 
macroeconomic aspect. Secondly, these results illuminate the role of foreign and 
domestic institutional investors in one large emerging market, China. Third, many 
elements of the measurement strategy used in this paper are generally applicable.  
Our results raise difficult questions. If FIIs do not possess a superior investment 
technology, would they be better with the investment strategies such as investing in 
index funds to DIIs? The intercept in the empirical model is significant at 1%, so I can 
say there are some new variables that render intercept or explanatory variables into 
insignificant. These two questions can lead to the new research field, which could be 
usefully explored and followed in the further research. 
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Appendix A: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Panel A:  
Stock price synchronicity 
R
2
 
coefficient of determination from the estimation of the 
estimation of the model in Eq. (1) 
Synch stock price synchronicity measured by log[R
2
/(1-R
2
)] 
Panel B: 
 
Explanatory Variables: 
D_Inst_C Changes of domestic institutional investors shareholdings 
D_Inst_H Domestic institutional investors shareholdings 
F_Inst_C Changes of foreign institutional investors shareholdings 
F_Inst_H Foreign institutional investors shareholdings 
Control Variables: 
 
SROA Standard deviation of return on asset of firm at time t 
Lny Represents logged form of per capita GDP at time t 
LnMV Logged form of market value of the firm.  
Lev 
Leverage of the firm i at time t. A firm’s leverage ratio is 
total liabilities divided by total assets. 
LnNum The log form of the company numbers in this industry.  
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Appendix B: Regression Results of Models 
Model 1 D_INST_C 
Dependent Variable: SYNCH   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 6/01/2007 9/01/2012  
Periods included: 22   
Cross-sections included: 48   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 1056  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LNNUM -0.148969 0.043938 -3.390432 0.0007 
SROA 0.397393 1.092412 0.363776 0.7161 
LNY -0.032780 0.111970 -0.292760 0.7698 
LNMV -0.331170 0.069722 -4.749866 0.0000 
LEV -0.264618 0.368864 -0.717385 0.4733 
D_INST_C -0.032025 0.018903 -1.694137 0.0905 
C 3.074475 1.116235 2.754326 0.0060 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.232819    Mean dependent var -0.436341 
Adjusted R-squared 0.193045    S.D. dependent var 0.929757 
S.E. of regression 0.835207    Akaike info criterion 2.526611 
Sum squared resid 699.6632    Schwarz criterion 2.775663 
Log likelihood -1281.051    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.621018 
F-statistic 5.853535    Durbin-Watson stat 2.163496 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Model 2 D_INST_H 
Dependent Variable: SYNCH   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 6/01/2007 9/01/2012  
Periods included: 22   
Cross-sections included: 48   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 1056  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LNNUM -0.123940 0.043592 -2.843206 0.0046 
SROA -0.058716 1.091439 -0.053797 0.9571 
 43 
 
LNY -0.105579 0.112115 -0.941710 0.3466 
LNMV -0.313093 0.069196 -4.524756 0.0000 
LEV -0.112029 0.368319 -0.304164 0.7611 
D_INST_H -0.952343 0.230206 -4.136923 0.0000 
C 3.625151 1.115845 3.248793 0.0012 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.243531    Mean dependent var -0.436341 
Adjusted R-squared 0.204313    S.D. dependent var 0.929757 
S.E. of regression 0.829355    Akaike info criterion 2.512550 
Sum squared resid 689.8936    Schwarz criterion 2.761602 
Log likelihood -1273.626    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.606956 
F-statistic 6.209568    Durbin-Watson stat 2.161651 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Model 3 F_INST_C 
Dependent Variable: SYNCH   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 6/01/2007 9/01/2012  
Periods included: 22   
Cross-sections included: 48   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 1055  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LNNUM -0.143560 0.043872 -3.272264 0.0011 
SROA 0.458831 1.093215 0.419708 0.6748 
LNY -0.049024 0.112198 -0.436940 0.6622 
LNMV -0.320298 0.069998 -4.575829 0.0000 
LEV -0.274777 0.369339 -0.743968 0.4571 
F_INST_C -0.019729 0.035506 -0.555660 0.5786 
C 3.113167 1.118375 2.783653 0.0055 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.230956    Mean dependent var -0.435597 
Adjusted R-squared 0.191046    S.D. dependent var 0.929883 
S.E. of regression 0.836355    Akaike info criterion 2.529403 
Sum squared resid 700.8879    Schwarz criterion 2.778643 
Log likelihood -1281.260    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.623885 
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F-statistic 5.786853    Durbin-Watson stat 2.166189 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Model 4 F_INST_H 
Dependent Variable: SYNCH   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 6/01/2007 9/01/2012  
Periods included: 22   
Cross-sections included: 48   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 1056  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LNNUM -0.144638 0.043758 -3.305373 0.0010 
SROA 0.309139 1.094030 0.282569 0.7776 
LNY -0.079637 0.113383 -0.702373 0.4826 
LNMV -0.333777 0.069731 -4.786642 0.0000 
LEV -0.266881 0.368648 -0.723946 0.4693 
F_INST_H -2.564759 1.293696 -1.982506 0.0477 
C 3.549421 1.139245 3.115590 0.0019 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.233627    Mean dependent var -0.436341 
Adjusted R-squared 0.193895    S.D. dependent var 0.929757 
S.E. of regression 0.834767    Akaike info criterion 2.525558 
Sum squared resid 698.9265    Schwarz criterion 2.774610 
Log likelihood -1280.495    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.619964 
F-statistic 5.880035    Durbin-Watson stat 2.163431 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Model 5 All explanatory variables 
Dependent Variable: SYNCH   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/26/15   Time: 18:25   
Sample (adjusted): 6/01/2007 9/01/2012  
Periods included: 22   
Cross-sections included: 48   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 1055  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
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LNNUM -0.128729 0.043769 -2.941082 0.0033 
SROA -0.258533 1.093944 -0.236331 0.8132 
LNY -0.143124 0.114095 -1.254430 0.2100 
LNMV -0.322164 0.069659 -4.624889 0.0000 
LEV -0.105391 0.368054 -0.286347 0.7747 
F_INST_H -2.614086 1.328862 -1.967162 0.0494 
F_INST_C -0.015901 0.036738 -0.432822 0.6652 
D_INST_H -0.929043 0.238122 -3.901538 0.0001 
D_INST_C -0.016164 0.019327 -0.836369 0.4031 
C 4.087307 1.139573 3.586700 0.0004 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.247526    Mean dependent var -0.435597 
Adjusted R-squared 0.206098    S.D. dependent var 0.929883 
S.E. of regression 0.828537    Akaike info criterion 2.513309 
Sum squared resid 685.7867    Schwarz criterion 2.776657 
Log likelihood -1269.770    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.613139 
F-statistic 5.974908    Durbin-Watson stat 2.163866 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Model 6 Add additional variables 
Dependent Variable: SYNCH   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/26/15   Time: 18:29   
Sample (adjusted): 6/01/2007 9/01/2012  
Periods included: 22   
Cross-sections included: 48   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 1054  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LNNUM -0.129608 0.044909 -2.886012 0.0040 
SROA -0.258331 1.093375 -0.236270 0.8133 
LNY -0.021883 0.134074 -0.163218 0.8704 
LNMV -0.329198 0.069967 -4.705027 0.0000 
LEV -0.124880 0.368473 -0.338912 0.7347 
F_INST_H -3.142191 1.358135 -2.313607 0.0209 
F_INST_C -0.017517 0.036746 -0.476716 0.6337 
D_INST_H -1.164596 0.268678 -4.334538 0.0000 
D_INST_C -0.016175 0.019338 -0.836469 0.4031 
S_C -0.005455 0.006491 -0.840356 0.4009 
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S_H -0.389935 0.215038 -1.813329 0.0701 
C 3.253496 1.235998 2.632283 0.0086 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.250875    Mean dependent var -0.435312 
Adjusted R-squared 0.208003    S.D. dependent var 0.930278 
S.E. of regression 0.827894    Akaike info criterion 2.513593 
Sum squared resid 682.6668    Schwarz criterion 2.786554 
Log likelihood -1266.664    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.617072 
F-statistic 5.851762    Durbin-Watson stat 2.164450 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Appendix C: Fixed Effects and Random Effects Model Test 
Model 1 D_INST_C 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: ALL    
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 5.499632 (47,982) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 246.749767 47 0.0000 
Period F 1.179359 (21,982) 0.2606 
Period Chi-square 26.302561 21 0.1951 
     
     
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: ALL    
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 0.000000 5 0.0000 
     
     
Model 2 D_INST_H 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: ALL    
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 5.271363 (47,982) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 237.576940 47 0.0000 
Period F 0.995795 (21,982) 0.4656 
Period Chi-square 22.251431 21 0.3851 
     
     
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: ALL    
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 0.000000 5 0.0000 
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Model 3 F_INST_C 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: ALL    
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 5.476526 (47,981) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 245.815402 47 0.0000 
Period F 1.296341 (21,981) 0.1672 
Period Chi-square 28.877843 21 0.1170 
     
     
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: ALL    
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 48.985888 5 0.0000 
     
     
Model 4 F_INST_H 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: ALL    
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 5.471866 (47,982) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 245.638256 47 0.0000 
Period F 1.296174 (21,982) 0.1673 
Period Chi-square 28.872490 21 0.1171 
     
     
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: ALL    
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 0.000000 5 0.0000 
     
     
Model 5 All explanatory variables 
Combine Variables 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
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Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 5.263356 (47,978) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 237.896982 47 0.0000 
Period F 1.019026 (21,978) 0.4363 
Period Chi-square 22.835451 21 0.3528 
     
     
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 51.724224 8 0.0000 
     
     
Model 6 Add additional variables 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 5.320310 (47,975) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 240.631583 47 0.0000 
Period F 1.040861 (21,975) 0.4096 
Period Chi-square 23.368184 21 0.3247 
     
     
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 57.297895 10 0.0000 
     
     
 
 
 
